

Joseon Dynasty's Perceptions of the Qing Dynasty in the 1860s and 1870s: A Focus on the Opium War

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1. Lips and Teeth: Joseon Dynasty's Perceptions of the External Crisis
2. Destabilisation of the Sadae (事大) Relationship an Increase of Self-esteem and Sense of National Pride
3. Causes for Destabilisation of the Sadae (事大) elationship and Change of Joseon's Perceptions of the Qing Dynasty
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<Abstract>

During the 1860s and 1870s, the Qing Dynasty of China has faced unprecedented ruling crisis resulting from a series of severe challenges such as the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion. Under such circumstances, how did the Joseon Dynasty perceive and face Qing's crises of governance? How were the Sino-Joseon relations like at that time? This paper explored government publications such as *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* (朝鮮王朝實錄), *Records of Daily Reflection* (日省錄) and *The Diaries of the Royal Secretariat* (承政院日記), and collective works of related personages such as *Collected Works of Unyang* (雲養集), *Collected Books of Huanzhai* (鸞齋叢書), *Collected Works of Chungam* (重菴集), *Collected Works of Lee Geon-chang* (明美堂集) and *Collected Works of Hwang Hyeon* (梅泉野錄) for the changes of Joseon's perceptions of the Qing Dynasty by way of vertical comparison in the process of narrative analysis. This paper argues that the Joseon Dynasty felt the

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same sense of crisis faced by the Qing Dynasty's inner challenges, and acknowledged that their fates were closely intertwined, and the traditional Sadae (事大) relationship faced destabilisation from the Joseon people's increasing demands for a sense of respect.

* Key words: Opium War, Joseon Dynasty, Perceptions of the Qing Dynasty, Sense of Crisis, the 19th Century

As is known to all, the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century experienced great challenges from the First and Second Opium Wars as well as the Taiping Rebellion and therefore its reign was at great risk. How did the Joseon Dynasty perceive and react to the Qing Dynasty's political turmoil while having no reluctance for maintaining subservient relations? What were the characteristics of Sino-Joseon¹⁾ relations at that time? A deep consideration of these issues can help straighten out the developing line of Sino-Joseon relations and allow a better understanding of current Sino-Korean relations, and therefore shed light on how to effectively solve the conflicts and collisions of the present day. Until now, this topic has rarely been researched in domestic China.²⁾ Despite the attention and

1) Joseon in this paper does not refer to the DPRK but the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910).

2) At the present China, the related topic was elaborated only in "A Review of the Responses of Joseon Kings and Ministers to the Two Opium Wars (朝鮮君臣對兩次鴉片戰爭的反應評述)" and the article focused only on the analysis and judgment of the Joseon kings and ministers' way of responses itself. See, Yongchun Li (李永春), "A Review of the Responses of Joseon Kings and Ministers to the Two Opium Wars (朝鮮君臣對兩次鴉片戰爭的反應評述)," *Collected Papers of Study on Korea (韓國學論文集)* 16 (2007): 45-54. Other researches about the two Opium Wars rarely discussed the Joseon Dynasty's perceptions of China during that period of time in a deep way, even if the topic was mentioned. It was about the perceptual knowledge of the public and there was no complete and precise logical analysis as well as argumentation. See Zhangchun Li (黎章春) and Lan Lu (盧嵐), "On the Influence of the Opium Wars on the Eastern and Western Societies (論鴉片戰爭對東西方社會的影響)," *Journal of Gannan Teacher's College (贛南師範學院學報)* 4 (1990): 6-10. Xiuyu Jiang (姜秀玉), "Influences of Opium

gains in research garnered in South Korea and Japan since the 1980s,³⁾ it is the response of the Joseon kings and his ministers to the two Opium Wars that has been the focus,⁴⁾ and Joseon's perceptions of the Qing Dynasty in the 1860s and 1870s and the corresponding causes have not been discussed at great length. Therefore, this paper centers on how the Joseon Dynasty perceived and reacted to the First and Second Opium Wars of Qing

War on Korea - Including the Effects of Illustrated Treaties on the Maritime Kingdoms on Korean Society (鴉片戦争对朝鮮的影响—兼论《海国图志》对朝鮮社会的影响),” *Journal of Yanbian University (Social Science)* (延边大学学报(社会科学版) 6 (2009): 92-95.

- 3) See Tamaki Harada (原田環), “Awareness of the External Crisis in Korea in the 19th Century (十九世紀の朝鮮における対外的危機意識),” *Bulletin of Society for Study in Korean History* (朝鮮史研究会論文集) 21 (1984): 73-105. Tu-Ki Min (閔斗基), “The Sense of External Crisis of Joseon in the Mid- to Late- 19th Century - Centered on the Responses to the First, the Second Opium War and the Appearance of the Foreign Ships (十九世紀後半 朝鮮王朝의 對外危機意識 - 第一次, 第二次中英戰爭과 異樣船 出沒에의 對應),” *THE DONG BANG HAK CHI: The Journal of Korean Studies* (東方學志) 52 (1986): 259-279. Chiharu Miyoshi (三好千春), “On the Information of Beijing Envoys during the Opium Wars (アヘン戦争に關する燕行使情報),” *Journal of Historical Studies* (史艸) 30 (1989): 28-62. Ibid., “Information Sources of Yon-hen-Sa Concerning the Opium War (アヘン戦争に關する燕行使の情報源),” *THE YASUSHI RAKU SHI SONO* (寧樂史苑) 35 (1990): 21-32. Ibid., “The Instability of the ‘Sadae’ Relation during Two Opium Wars-Especially the Period of the Second Opium War (兩次アヘン戦争と事大關係の動搖),” *Bulletin of Society for Study in Korean History* (朝鮮史研究會論文集) 27 (1990): 47-68. Jung-shik Ha (河政植), “Responses of Joseon towards Occidental Powers’ Invasion of China (歐美列強의 中國侵略과 朝鮮의 反應),” *The Oriental Studies* (東洋學) 28 (1998): 1-17. Ibid., “Responses to the Opium War in Korea and Japan in the 1840s (阿片戰爭과 朝鮮・日本),” *STUDIES ON MODERN CHINA* (近代中國研究) 2 (2001): 23-56.
- 4) “The Sense of External Crisis of Joseon in the Mid- to Late- 19th Century - Centered on the Responses to the First, the Second Opium War and the Appearance of the Foreign Ships (十九世紀後半朝鮮王朝의 對外危機意識 - 第一次, 第二次中英戰爭과 異樣船 出沒에의 對應)” of South Korean Tu-Ki Min (閔斗基), “Responses to the Opium War in Korea and Japan in the 1840s (阿片戰爭과 朝鮮・日本)” of South Korean Jung-shik Ha (河政植) and “Awareness of the External Crisis in Korea in the 19th Century (十九世紀の朝鮮における対外的危機意識)” of the Japanese scholar Tamaki Harada (原田環) are the representatives.

Dynasty in the 1860s and 1870s, and will analyse Joseon's perceptions of the Qing Dynasty by way of vertical comparison, contrasting the changes in perceptions before and after this period of time, subsequently revealing the causes for and trends of the development of Sino-Joseon relations, hence providing a new perspective in understanding current Sino-Korean relations.

1. Lips and Teeth: Joseon Dynasty's Perceptions of the External Crisis

The Qing Dynasty had begun to decline from the Kangxi and Qianlong times of peace and prosperity in the 19th century, and the First Opium War (1840-1842) in particular, which broke out in the Daoguang Period (1821-1850), had brought huge disgrace to the once flourishing Qing. All these influenced and marked great challenges to Joseon relations with the Qing. Yet, despite the failure of the Qing government in the war, the Joseon government had shown little reaction, and the traditional subservient relations between Qing and Joseon were maintained.⁵⁾ The two countries continued their exchanges under the traditional framework of tributary relationship.⁶⁾ In other words, the First Opium War alerted the

5) Ha (河), "Responses to the Opium War in Korea and Japan in the 1840s (阿片戰爭과 朝鮮·日本)," 25-32.

6) According to statistics, during the Daoguang period (1821-1850), Joseon had sent envoys to Qing 66 times, 2.2 on average every year. See Hae-Jong Chun (全海宗), *Analects of History of Sino-Korean Relations* (中韓關係史論集), trans. Jin Shanji (金善姬) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press (中国社会科学出版社), 1987), 194. Moreover, according to the records in *The Annals of King Cheoljong* (哲宗實錄), upon hearing the news about the demise of Qing's Emperor Daoguang, the Joseon king and ministers commented, "Emperor Daoguang, during his thirty-year reign, showed solicitude for the vassal Joseon and gave us great favor (道光皇帝三十年之間, 顧念小邦, 屢施格外之恩)", and they felt "truly sorrowful" for his demise and expressed their "great condolences."

Joseon Dynasty of the opium problem and the accompanying harm.⁷⁾

In contrast to the indifference to the First Opium War, which was identified as a local riot,⁸⁾ the loss incurred by the Qing government in the Second Opium War (1856-1860) greatly disturbed the Joseon royal court. On December 9th of the 11th Year of King Cheoljong (哲宗) (1860), the official-letter-dispatching envoy (齎咨官) Kim Kyeong-su (金景遂) (1818-?) submitted a report about the fall of Beijing, the ruin of the Old Summer Palace Gardens of Perfect Brightness, and the Emperor's taking refuge in Jehol (or present-day Chengde in Hebei Province).⁹⁾ After that, the Joseon government immediately took the advice of the Bibyeonsa (備邊司, the Office of Border Defense, the supreme administrative organ since mid-Joseon) and dispatched envoys to Jehol to ask after Emperor Xianfeng.¹⁰⁾ And on the next day (December 10th), officials of higher position were urgently called to the court for the Chadae (次對, Joseon

(See February 4th of King Cheoljong Year 1 (1850), Volume 2 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Cheoljong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·哲宗實錄)). It can be inferred that the nation-state relations between China and Joseon was working well (All the materials of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* are cited from the website of <http://sillok.history.go.kr/main/main.do>).

7) Min (閔), "The Sense of External Crisis of Joseon in the Mid- to Late- 19th Century - Centered on the Responses to the First, the Second Opium War and the Appearance of the Foreign Ships (十九世紀後半 朝鮮王朝의 對外危機意識 - 第一次, 第二次中英戰爭과 異樣船 出沒에의 對應)," 259-279. And, as for the responses of Joseon to the First Opium War, Tu-Ki Min (閔斗基) has made detailed elaboration in the aforementioned articles, hence it won't be repeated here.

8) Ha (河), "Responses of Joseon towards Occidental Powers' Invasion of China (歐美列強의 中國侵略과 朝鮮의 反應)," 15.

9) "Handwritten Reports by the Official-letter-dispatching envoy (齎咨官) Kyeong-Su Kim (金景遂) to the Bibyeonsa (備邊司, the Office of Border Defense, the supreme administrative organ since mid-Joseon) (齎咨官金景遂以手本報備局)," in December 9th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 11 (1860), Ilseongrok (日省錄, Records of Daily Reflection).

10) December 9th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 11 (1860), Volume 12 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Cheoljong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·哲宗實錄).

officials of higher positions going to the court six times a month to report important issues and discuss them with the king). They discussed how Joseon would be affected by the Qing's defeat and pointed out: "The relationship between Yenjing (refers to China, the author's note) to Joseon is akin to that between the lip and the teeth. If Yenjing was in danger, how can Joseon be safe? (燕京之於我國，卽唇齒之比也。燕京若危，則我國豈晏然乎?)"¹¹⁾ Moreover, after the envoy Cho Whie-lim (趙徽林) (1808- ?) and his party aforementioned returned from Jehol to Joseon in 1861, King Cheoljong (哲宗) summoned them for himself and made a detailed inquiry asking, "how are the state of affairs like in Central China (中原事勢何如)?"¹²⁾ Thus it can be seen that the Qing Dynasty's failure in the Second Opium War brought to the Joseon Dynasty a severe sense of crisis comparable to "teeth can't live without lips," while also causing King Cheoljong (哲宗)'s great concern.

The sense of crisis akin to "lips and teeth" spread among the Joseon intellectuals and ordinary people as well. As soon as the news that the Taiping Rebellion had broken out, in particular that the Anglo-French Allied Forces had invaded Beijing and Emperor Xianfeng had fled to Jehol for shelter, the people were seised with panic and rumors ran wild.¹³⁾ To their mind, the western imperialists and Taiping rebels would

11) December 9th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 11 (1860), *The Diaries of the Royal Secretariat* (承政院日記).

12) June 19th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 12 (1861), Volume 13 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Cheoljong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·哲宗實錄).

13) See "The Diaries of the Royal Secretariat (承政院日記)," December 9th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 11 (1860). "His majesty (King Cheoljong, the author's note) said, it is said that the popular mind is agitated recently and many people returned to their hometown. (The middle section is omitted.) Hoe-su Park (朴晦壽) said, people in the eastern part (Joseon, the author's note) are vibrant in nature. Rumors went around before and since the decline of Beijing, the people have no definite view of the situation, which fermented the rumors and make them more worried and upset (上曰,

endanger Joseon at any time. For example, when Park Kyu-su (朴珪壽) (1807-1877) as the deputy envoy went to Jehol to ask after Emperor Xianfeng in January of 1861,¹⁴ Kim Yun-shik (金允植) (1835-1922) said, “The western imperialists have been rampant for long and the people are suffering a great deal (The middle section is omitted). As central China has been invaded, Joseon will soon have the same fate. (洋夷猖獗日久。天下被其害。(中略)今中州既殘。次將及於我矣。).”¹⁵ Shin Seok-woo (申錫愚) (1805-1865), the winter solstice envoy who returned to Joseon in March of 1861, also said: “It is said that Joseon is now faced with two worries. First, the western imperialists have already run wild in Beijing and they may take the advantage and invade Joseon (The middle section is omitted). The other is that the Taiping rebels were violent in the adjacent places around the capital (Beijing, the author's note) and our bordering areas in the west may be taken. (今之憂者, 其說有二, 洋夷既滿皇城, 則或恐因勢東犯, (中略) 曰南匪滋及近省, 則或恐搶我西鄙).”¹⁶ More than that, Kim Pyoung-mook (金平默) (1819-1891) held that “the western invaders will definitely devour China and in turn cast their eyes on Joseon and then swallow up our country (西洋必陸沉中國。而唇齒東韓。胥及於溺矣。).”¹⁷ In other words, he thought Joseon would follow China's steps

聞近日民心騷動, 多有落鄉者云, (中略) 晦壽曰, 東俗好動, 自前已多騷訛, 而近自北京事以後, 一倍騷擾, 胥動浮言, 民無定志, 莫可鎮安.”

- 14) January 18th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 12 (1861), Volume 13 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Cheoljong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·哲宗實錄).
- 15) Yun-shik Kim (金允植), “Foreword to Seeing off Sir Hwanjae Park Kyu-su to Jehol (奉送職齋朴先生珪壽赴熱河序),” in Sequel Volume 2 of Collected Works of Unyang (雲養集), the 328th book of Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 2004), 599.
- 16) March 27th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 12 (1861), The Diaries of the Royal Secretariat (承政院日記).
- 17) Pyeong-muk Kim (金平默), “Chido sa ui (治道私議, Personal Views on Governing a Country),” in Volume 35 of Collected Works of Chungam (重菴集), the 320th book of Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean

and be annexed by the western imperialists.

It is thus clear that Joseon felt a deep sense of crisis akin to “lips and teeth” with Qing and thought they shared the same fate when Qing was faced with the severe reality of both domestic strife and foreign aggression. However, differing from Joseon ministers’ requiting gratitude for salvation in the late Ming Dynasty by risking their lives to go off to the Battle of Sarhu (薩爾滸) with the determination of “setting off in the daybreak despite losing life at sunset (朝赴夕死),” the consciousness of sharing a common destiny then is based on realistic interests and on a utilitarian purpose. Kim Yun-shik (金允植) wrote in 1861 in *Foreword to Seeing off Sir Hwanjae Park Kyu-su to Jehol* (奉送職齋朴先生珪壽赴熱河序):

Despite the rather different size, Joseon to the Qing Dynasty is what the teeth is to the lips. If Qing is in trouble, our country would suffer. (The middle section is omitted.) What we should do now is to visit the assaulted venues (Central China, the author’s note) to ascertain the real situations. This is comparable to what we should do to prevent contracting illness – asking a patient with the same disease about its causes. (The middle section is omitted.) Close to the Qing’s birth land, we are always kindly and generously treated by the Qing Dynasty. Till now, it’s been more than two hundred years (The middle section is omitted). We have garnered great favor from them, too. They are in trouble temporarily now. Yet, if heaven favors, the Qing may regain their capital city and restore their reign. Loyalty would be appreciated and betrayal would be detested. We lend the helping hand when Qing is in trouble. They would later favor Joseon more and better (我之於清。小大雖殊。實唇齒之國也。清之不幸。非國之福。(中略)爲今計者。當之先受攻處。以覘其利害虛實。譬猶人欲調防於未病之前。當之先病者而

Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 2003), 17.

問其病崇之因由。(中略)清人以我近於其根本之地。故終始厚遇。迄二百餘年。(中略)受其賜亦多矣。彼雖遭困於一時。若天心未改。還都之後。修復舊政。賞信義絕反覆。以我不倍於危亂之際。其見遇必愈厚。).¹⁸⁾

Simply put, Kim Yun-shik (金允植) thought that Joseon had already kept two hundred years of the Sadae (事大) relationship (traditional subservient relations) with Qing and “also benefited a lot from the Qing court (受其賜亦多),” hence should not turn their backs on the Qing when the latter was in trouble. Moreover, in the “difficult and dangerous (艱危)” time of “Qing’s losing the war and the Emperor’s escaping to Jehol (清師敗績。皇帝出避熱河),” Joseon would also need to take actions to collect inside information of the Qing court by dispatching envoys so as to take effective preventive preparations and measures for the possible invasion from the western imperialists and the Chinese rebels. And once the Qing government “reestablishes their strong reign (修復舊政)” in the future and gets back on the rails, the Qing would appreciate Joseon’s loyalty and later favor Joseon through diplomacy and with military support in times of emergency.

As mentioned above, the reason why Kim Yun-shik (金允植) argued that Joseon should “go through thick and thin together with the Qing and support each other all the time (共患難而全終始)” lies in his concern for Joseon’s interests from a realistic perspective. In comparison to the situation in which ministers of the Joseon court ran up against with Gwanghaegun (光海君, or Prince Gwanghae) (reign time: 1608-1623) and risked their lives to take part in the Battle of Sarhu (薩爾滸), Joseon’s sense of community with Qing this time was very weak. After the Japanese Invasion of Korea (壬辰倭亂) (1592-1598), ministers of the

18) Kim (金允植), “Foreword to Seeing off Sir Hwanjae Park Kyu-su to Jehol (奉送職齋朴先生珪壽赴熱河序),” 599-560.

Joseon court who were loyal to the Ming Dynasty (義理派) held that Joseon should assume the obligation of returning Ming's great favor. So, in face of the Battle of Sarhu, they thought "it is just the occasion to pay the debt of gratitude (圖報萬一, 正在今日)"¹⁹⁾ and all claimed that "when the Ming royal court was at the critical time, it is the vassal states' duty to give support. Moreover, our country owed great gratitude to Chinese imperial court for saving us from the Japanese invasion. So, we should call up all forces and supplies to fight with the Ming in the battle despite setting off in the daybreak and losing our lives at sunset. This is our unshakable duty. (王室有急, 則諸侯赴難, 分義所當然。況我國之於天朝, 有再造曲全之恩者乎? 雖悉素敝賦, 朝赴夕死, 固不敢辭。)"²⁰⁾ In the pursuit of righteousness, officials of Bibyeonsa (備邊司, the Office of Border Defense, the supreme administrative organ since mid-Joseon) even disregarded the cost of turning against Gwanghaegun (光海君, or Prince Gwanghae) and they claimed, "the original intention of your majesty is to benefit the people, and what we want to strive for is to pursue righteousness. Rather than offend the Chinese imperial court, we would run against your majesty (Gwanghaegun, the author's note)'s wish. (聖意所在, 本爲澤民, 臣等所爭, 只欲循義。與其得罪於天朝, 寧得罪於聖明。)"²¹⁾

What should be pointed out is that Kim Yun-shik's perceptions of Qing based on the realistic interests of Joseon court were rather representative during that period of time, which was also evident in King Cheoljong's attitude. On June 19th, 1861, when summoning the envoys returning from

19) May 22nd of Prince Gwanghae (光海) Year 10 (1618), Volume 128 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Diaries of Prince Gwanghae* (朝鮮王朝實錄·光海君日記).

20) May 2nd of Prince Gwanghae (光海) Year 10 (1618), *op. cit.*

21) June 20th of Prince Gwanghae (光海) Year 10 (1618), Volume 129 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Diaries of Prince Gwanghae* (朝鮮王朝實錄·光海君日記).

Jehol, he said, “in the troubled time, the Sadae (事大, serving the great) relationship should be maintained (當此艱危之時, 其在事大之道)” and we should send envoys to “pay our respects to the Emperor (一番問安之禮)”²²⁾; yet, he turned rather sensitive when he heard that “no envoys from other vassal states came to ask after Emperor Xianfeng except us from Joseon (今行, 卽列國所無, 東國獨有之)” and questioned more closely whether it was true that only Joseon sent envoys to ask after the Qing Emperor.²³⁾ Moreover, when summoning the winter solstice envoy party who came to the court to express their gratitude in October of the same year, he specifically asked the envoys to keep abreast of the latest developments in the Qing court and the number of the envoys from other vassal states.²⁴⁾ From the aforementioned, one can assume that King Cheoljong (哲宗) harbored worries towards the authority and power of “the superior state (上國, the Qing court)” and had scruples about whether it was right to “go through thick and thin together with Qing and support each other all the time (共患難而全終始).”

22) June 19th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 12 (1861), Volume 13 of op. cit.

23) June 19th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 12 (1861), Volume 126 of *The Diaries of the Royal Secretariat* (承政院日記). “How many vassal states paid the tribute to the Qing? And is it true that there were no envoys from other states? (凡朝貢諸國爲幾許, 而果無別使之入來者乎?).”

24) October 24th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 12 (1861), *Op. cit.* “His majesty said, I’ve heard when Emperor Xianfeng reigned, those ministers abusing the power were all questioned and removed from court. Does the Qing court appoint virtuous people now? Are their people’s minds stable? In the present time of foreign invasion, how many foreign envoys go there to pay tribute? You are to collect information about the aforementioned(上曰, 聞, 咸豐時, 用權諸臣, 皆革職拿問云矣。今則任用, 果得賢良, 而其人心, 亦能安頓, 當此搶攘之際, 外國使臣之來貢者, 爲幾許, 亦爲一體探問以來。).”

2. Destabilisation of the Sadae(事大) Relationship and Increase of Self-esteem and Sense of National Pride

In the process of the “Eastern Occupation of a Western Power (西勢東漸)” and Joseon’s increasing external crisis, subtle changes started to bud in Joseon’s perceptions of China. The Joseon government was increasingly losing their trust of the Qing government and the traditional Sadae (事大) relationship was becoming unstable. Before Byengin-yangyo (丙寅洋擾, French Invasion of Kanghwa Island in 1866), the Qing government sent an official communication to keep Joseon informed of the news of French troops invading Joseon because it was said that the Joseon government had murdered a French missionary. The Qing government urged the Joseon government to conduct a deep investigation and argued strongly on just grounds to not start the war.²⁵⁾ As a result, the 4th deputy commanders of the Five Guards (副護軍) Gi Jung-jin (奇正鎭) (1798-1879) of the Joseon government held that the Qing government

25) July 8th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 3 (1866), Volume 3 of The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Gojong (朝鮮王朝實錄·高宗實錄). The original contents are as follows: “The other day, the French ambassador repeatedly applied visas to Joseon for the missionaries, however the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined the request on the grounds that professing a religion was against the Joseon people’s will. Moreover, according to the French ambassador’s diplomatic note, it was said that the King of Goryeo (Joseon, the author’s note) killed two French bishops, nine missionaries and all local people taking the religion, no matter the age and gender. Hence, France would summon troops and naval vessels in a few days to start war with Joseon. Now that China has known this, it couldn’t shake off the duty of mediating in between and asked Joseon to first investigate the incident on reasonable grounds if the French saying was true, and tried to avoid the military conflict by carefully consider the situation (前因法國公使, 屢請發給傳教士護照往朝鮮, 而自總理衙門, 以習教非朝鮮所願, 礙難發照行文矣。復據法國公使照會內, 稱高麗國王, 將法國主教二人及傳教士九人, 竝本地習教男婦老幼, 盡行殺害。是以命將興師兵船, 不日齊集云。中國既知此事, 不能不從中排解, 而如果有殺害教士等情, 先行據理查詢, 不必遽起兵端, 以此行知該國, 使之熟思審處).”

displayed a sense of half-threat and half-mediation and therefore was not the honest concern from a truly friendly nation. When submitting a request to the King, he commented, “Beijing has sent an official communication to us. The wording and expressions in it carry special meaning which on the one hand tries to scare us with an empty threat, and on the other hand acts as an intermediary (至有北京移咨之來。其辭意殊常，半涉虛喝，半涉調停).”²⁶⁾

This distrustful attitude was more evidently displayed after the Qing government's Ministry of Rites informed Joseon of Japan's intention of invasion in June of 1874. On April 27th 1874, Japan outrageously dispatched troops to Taiwan on the excuse of the Mudan Incident (Chinese: 牡丹社事件).²⁷⁾ In order to ensure Joseon's security, the Qing government's Ministry of Rites at once dispatched a secret official communication to Joseon and suggested the latter to “sign treaties and start commercial relations” with France and the U.S. so as to tie Japan down.²⁸⁾ Regarding this, the chief state councilor (領議政) Lee Yoo-won

26) August 16th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 3 (1866), Volume 3 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Gojong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·高宗實錄).

27) On December 11th 1871, people on the Island of Miyakojima (宮古島), Ryukyu Kingdom (琉球王國), floated onto the Southeastern coast of Taiwan because of strong wind; 54 of them landed and intruded into the living areas of the native people and hence were killed. This is called the Mudan Incident (Chinese: 牡丹社事件) which caused the Japanese punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874.

28) June 24th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 11 (1874), Volume 11 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Gojong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·高宗實錄). The original contents are as follows: “According to the foreign general Prosper Marie Giquel (日意格) (a French, the author's note), ‘Japan stations five thousand troops in Nagasaki now. After they withdraw their troops in Taiwan, they will invade Goryeo (Joseon, the author's note). As France and the U. S. are not in good relations with Goryeo and the two countries will surely be Japan's allies. Goryeo is not strong enough to resist. If China can make Goryeo sign treaties to start business with France and the U. S., Japan will stand alone and dare not invade Goryeo, which will save Goryeo the country and people. Even if Japan invade Goryeo, the latter can still have power to fight against

(李裕元) (1814-1888) went so far as to think that the official communication from the Qing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was of the Qing's self-interest and it aimed to confuse Joseon's vision. He said, "if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs just intended to inform us of the message, then it is enough to send us only the message. Why does Qing advise us to trade with France and the U.S.? Isn't it like a false seduction under the disguise of threat? (總理衙門欲報我國之有事, 則只言有事而已, 何爲以通商等說, 有若恐動而誘之者乎?)."²⁹⁾

Hence, it can be inferred that during this period of time, although Joseon admitted that the Qing had "made an all-out effort to help them" for which they "cherished heartfelt gratitude (到底勤摯, 實爲感激)"³⁰⁾ and continued to adopt the traditional Sadae (事大) policy by reporting to the Qing court about the major issues for advice,³¹⁾ the Joseon government also developed an increasing sense of distrust towards the Qing government. Joseon had already known clearly that the Qing government could hardly save themselves, let alone protect its vassal state Joseon. This can be seen in Joseon envoys' perceptions of China. On

Japan with aid of France and the U. S.' (據洋將日意格云: '日本尚有五千兵長崎。台灣退兵後, 將從事高麗。法、美與高麗, 前隙未解, 必以兵船助之, 高麗不足以敵三國。若中國能令高麗與法、美立約通商, 則日本勢孤, 不敢動兵, 高麗之民得保全, 即使日本妄動, 高麗力亦足支')."

29) June 25th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 11 (1874), Volume 11 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Gojong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·高宗實錄).

30) October 25th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 8 (1871), Volume 8 of *op. cit.*

31) May 17th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 8 (1871), *op. cit.* "The State Council (議政府) advised: 'The foreign bandits made trouble in Joseon and we sent the official communication to China. This is what has happened recently. However, the related details should also be fully elaborated. Hence, the civil officials are to write the communication and the official-letter-dispatching envoy (賚咨官) are to be elected by the Translation Institute so as to dispatch the official communication to China as soon as possible.' The king agreed (議政府啓: '洋匪滋擾, 移咨中國, 卽近例。然而此次之前後顛末, 亦不容不詳陳。令文任撰咨, 別賚咨官, 令譯院差出, 以爲從速入送何如?' 允之。)"

March 27th 1861, King Cheoljong (哲宗) of Joseon met with the returning winter solstice envoy party led by Shin Seok-woo (申錫愚). They exchanged ideas about China's situation after the Second Opium War and reached the conclusion that the Qing government signed those treaties with the UK and France not out of willingness but by force.

King Cheoljong (哲宗): "The reason why China has established friendly relations with the Western barbarians is definitely because of the latter's military threat. The Westerners' real intention is to propagate Christianity and sell opium. They themselves do not smoke opium, but make Chinese take them; their purpose is unknown (中國之與洋夷和親, 必是洋夷之以兵力勒和也, 此出於宣布邪教, 和賣鴉片之計也, 鴉片, 渠國之人不服, 使中國之人服之, 未知何意也。)"

Shin Seok-woo (申錫愚): "China's signing and abiding by the peaceful treaties is not out of their own willingness but the invaders' power. Although China rejects heterodoxy and bans opium, according to those treaties signed with the UK and France, the first can be spread and the latter can be traded in China; as for the other items, no one is for the Western barbarians' interests. Hence, it can be inferred that the Qing government was forced to make peace because they have no more power to resist (中國之聽和約, 出於勢不得已, 觀於英法和約書中, 可以推知, 邪教中國之所斥, 而許其傳習, 洋藥中國之所禁, 而許其交易, 其他所約條款, 皆取洋夷所便, 其力屈強和, 可知也。)"³²⁾

Some other Joseon envoys also expressed similar ideas. For instance, in the report submitted to the Bibyeonsa (備邊司, the Office of Border Defense, the supreme administrative organ since mid-Joseon), Park Kyu-su (朴珪壽) the Jehol deputy envoy pointed out that "anti-Qing forces

32) March 27th of King Cheoljong (哲宗) Year 12 (1861), Volume 126 of *The Diaries of the Royal Secretariat* (承政院日記).

(Taiping Rebellion (太平天國) and the NianJun (捻軍) Rebellion, the author's note) were rampant in many provinces of China for many years and were expanding their powerful strength every day in a very forceful way (各省賊匪之猖獗, 已多年所, 根盤藪鉅, 漸益滋蔓, 勢不可制),” “(the Western barbarians) were bold to wantonly do what they wanted in China and it's hard to imagine how things would develop in the future (恣行其志, 莫敢誰何, 後慮誠不知至於何境),” and the Qing court could be “hung by a thread considering the present situation (顧其時勢, 則若不保朝夕).”³³⁾ What's more, before Joseon envoy Lee Geon-chang (李建昌) was dispatched to China for the diplomatic mission, he once said, “China is the key place for foreign countries. When in China, we should carefully observe the situation, and hence we can be informed of foreign countries' conditions (中國者。外國之樞也。如入中國而善覘之。則可以知外國之情。).” Yet, after his mission to China from October, 1874 to April, 1875,³⁴⁾ he lamented, “It's beyond our expectations that China's situations have already become so severe and poor. Since China is in danger, our countries would soon have the same fate (吾猶不知中國之至於此也。中國如此。吾邦必隨之而已。).” Moreover, he also raised doubts about Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) who was greatly trusted by Joseon people and said,

33) Kyu-su Park (朴珪壽), “Letters Written by Park Kyu-su as the Jehol Deputy Envoy (熱河副使時抵人書),” in Hwanjae ch'ongsō 5 (瓏齋叢書 五, Book 5 of Collected Books of Huanzhai), ed. Daedong Institute for Korean Studies (大東文化研究院), Sungkyunkwan University (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 1996), 617-620. Kūn-su Song (宋近洙), Yongho hallok 3 (龍湖閒錄 三, Book 3 of Records at the Dragon Lake), No. 25 of Hanguk saryo chongsō (韓國史料叢書 25, Book 25 of Collected Books of Korean History) (Seoul: National Institute of Korean History (國史編纂委員會), 1979), 7-9.

34) From October of King Gojong (高宗) Year 11 (1874) to April of King Gojong (高宗) Year 12 (1875), Geon-chang Lee (李建昌) was sent to China as the secretary of the winter solstice envoys party. See October 28th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 11 (1874), Volume 12 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Gojong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·高宗實錄) and April 12th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 12 (1875), *op. cit.*

“Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) presented us (Joseon, the author's note) with a letter in which he purposefully intend to convince us of the benefits of setting up the friendly relations. People all regard Hongzhang as the renowned minister of China and his words are trustful. Yet, to my mind, he is venal. The venal people always sail with the wind. If we can't rely on anybody but him, we will be betrayed by him (李鴻章貽書于我。啖以通和之利。時人皆謂鴻章。中國名臣。其言可信。建昌獨曰。鴻章大儻也。儻惟時勢之從而已。我無以自恃而恃鴻章。則後必爲所賣。).”³⁵⁾ Affected by this distrustful attitude, the self-esteem and sense of national pride of Joseon were becoming more prominent, which was evidently present in Heungseon Daewongun (興宣大院君) (1820-1898)'s attitude after Joseon defeated the French fleet. He said,

Foreign invasion happened throughout almost all dynasties of China. Yet, the western barbarians haven't achieved their will in the past several hundred years. Since China has made peace with them the year before, the invaders' bullying and domineering is hard to imagine and the people are suffering a great deal from their committing evil everywhere. Only our country Joseon escapes the disaster and it is really the blessing of Gija (Chinese: 箕子) the holy saint (the honorific title for Gija, the author's note) (洋夷侵犯, 列國亦自有之。于今幾百年, 此賊不敢得意矣。伊自年前中國許和之後, 跳踉之心, 一倍巨測, 到處施惡, 皆受其毒。惟獨不行於我國, 實是箕聖之在天陰鷲也。).³⁶⁾

Here, Heungseon Daewongun (興宣大院君) pointed out that western countries were in nature aggressive, yet until then had not realised their

35) Geon-chang Lee (李建昌), “Volume 16 of Myōngmidang Chip (明美堂集),” No. 349 of Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 2005), 234.

36) September 11th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 3 (1866), Volume 3 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Gojong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·高宗實錄).

purpose. After China had “made peace (許和)” with them several years before, they had become more and more willful in perpetrating whatever evils in China. Despite the people’s suffering, only Joseon had gained success against the Western barbarians’ invasion through tough resistance. Thus, according to Heungseon Daewongun (興宣大院君), Joseon had achieved what China could not. Hence, in his opinion, China was no longer “the superior state (上國)” that could give advice or intervene in Joseon’s foreign affairs. This self-esteem and sense of national pride of Joseon were in great display during Sinmiyangyo (辛未洋擾, the American invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1871). On April 25th 1871, King Gojong (高宗) of Joseon and his ministers held a meeting after the Battle of Gwangseongbo (廣城堡). The Right State Councilor (右議政) Hong Sun-mog (洪淳穆) (1816-1883) stated:

Nowadays, the atmosphere of yin pathogen is pervasive and exerts a pernicious influence everywhere; only the Blue Hill (靑邱, Joseon, the author’s note) is not influenced and abides by the rites and law, morality and justice. Moreover, since the byeongin year (1866, the author’s note), we have successfully dispelled the foreign invaders and this has brought to us great pride in the world. Though it is not the same invaders this time, once they invade us, we will definitely not make peace with them (而見今一種陰邪之氣, 流毒四方, 惟此靑邱一片獨保乾淨者, 寔以禮義相守。故自丙寅以後, 攘斥洋醜, 又可以有辭於天下。今雖此夷, 若是侵犯, 和之一字, 斷非可論。).³⁷⁾

In other words, according to Hong Sun-mog (洪淳穆), under the international environment of “yin pathogen being pervasive and exerting a pernicious influence everywhere (陰邪之氣流毒四方),” only Joseon

37) April 25th of King Gojong (高宗) Year 8 (1871), Volume 8 of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty: The Annals of King Gojong* (朝鮮王朝實錄·高宗實錄).

stayed intact by firmly sticking to rites and law, morality and justice. In 1866, Joseon successfully defeated the French invaders in the byeonginyangyo (丙寅洋擾, the French invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1866), in which Joseon deservedly should have been proud. If the U.S. encroaches on Joseon, Joseon would definitely not make peace with them. Hence, the self-esteem and sense of national pride of Joseon kings and ministers increased tremendously after Joseon defeated France in the byeonginyangyo (丙寅洋擾, the French invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1866). During the 1860s and 1870s, the Self-strengthening Movement (洋務運動, 1861-1895) was thriving in China. Yet, before the early 1870s and when Heungseon Daewongun (興宣大院君) was in reign, Joseon had never discussed the Movement from the perspective of its government's policy and decision-making.³⁸⁾ Moreover, after defeating France in the byeonginyangyo (丙寅洋擾, the French invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1866), Joseon even held a critical attitude towards Qing's Self-strengthening Movement (洋務運動, 1861-1895) and its leader Prince Kung (恭親王) for a time,³⁹⁾ and this is also a display of Joseon's increasing sense of self-esteem and national pride.

What should be pointed out is that this kind of self-esteem and sense of national pride is not exclusive to the ruling class. The Conservative Confucianists of Wijeong-cheoksa pa (衛正斥邪派, the school of defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy) also presented it in an explicit way. For example, after the Qing started on the path of decline-a result of the frustration caused by the Second Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion- one of the leaders of the Wijeong-cheoksa pa (衛正斥邪派, the

38) Dae-Hwan Noh (노대환), "Joseon Intelligentsia's Perceptions of the Foreign Countries and the Self-strengthening Movement during the 1860s and 1870s (1860-70년대 전반 조선 지식인의 대외인식과 양무 이해)," *Korean Culture* (韓國文化) 20 (1997): 352.

39) Ibid., 328-331.

school of defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy), Kim Pyoung-mook (金平默), not only strongly advocated the Northern Conquest (北伐, or, euphemistically, Northern Expedition), but also pointed out:

After we accomplish the task of political construction and educating the people so as to resist the external powers, it will be the approximate time for us to build a great kingdom. Why? The reign of King Hyojong (孝宗) will benefit people under heaven. Hence it is the will of both God and the people to crown the Lee clan of Joseon as the king but not the Zhu clan of the late Ming Dynasty. This is the only way out (The middle section is omitted). We should recognise this as soon as possible and strive for it (到得修攘功成之時。別是我國自勦王業也。何也。孝廟功德。蓋於天下。則天命人心。當歸李氏。無歸於朱氏之理。這是無可柰何處。(中略)不可不識之於早而力爲之所也。).⁴⁰

As it follows, he regarded “the decline and demise of Ming has brought great suffering to the people (皇明之末。天下飽喫倒懸之苦),”⁴¹ and “we cannot get favor anymore from a collapsed old regime and it (the Ming Dynasty, the author’s note) is regarded by the people in the world just as the past dynasties of the Qin and Han (世遠澤斬。天下之視之。與秦漢之帝王無異).” That is to say, the Ming Dynasty cannot be restored. If the Northern Conquest succeeds, King Hyojong (孝宗) can take that as the opportunity to stabilise his reign. Joseon should be aware of this and strive for it as soon as possible. For this reason he stressed that “the best

40) Pyeong-muk Kim (金平默), “Reply to Seong-il Ryu (答柳聖一),” in Volume 26 of *Collected Works of Chungam* (重菴集), the 319th Book of *Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese* (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進黨), 2003), 519.

41) Ibid., “SamGang mundap (三江問答),” in Volume 37 of *Collected Works of Chungam* (重菴集), the 320th Book of *Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese* (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進黨), 2003), 49.

way is not to rely on others but to become more powerful (故上策莫如自強我事),” and hoped Joseon to be self-reliant⁴²⁾ while pointing out, if Joseon does not achieve self-reliance, when “foreign invaders take hold of China (他夷入主中國),” Joseon could “do nothing but to serve them (事之之外。豈有他策)” and continue the Sadae (事大) relationship.⁴³⁾

3. Causes for Destabilisation of the Sadae (事大) relationship and Change of Joseon's Perceptions of the Qing Dynasty

To sum up, during the 1860s and 1870s, when Qing's failure in the Second Opium War brought to Joseon a severe sense of crisis akin to “lips and teeth,” Joseon, on the one hand, continued the traditional Sadae (事大) relationship with Qing, and on the other hand, developed a sense of independence and national pride which destabilised the Sadae relationship. The corresponding causes can be summarised as follows. Firstly, despite the appeasement policy adopted by the Qing Dynasty, the nation-state relationship between China and Joseon had been put on the track of harmonious development after the Kang and Qian times of peace and prosperity; yet, the Qing Dynasty had not really garnered Joseon's true gratitude and obedience. The words in *Maecheon yarok* (梅泉野錄 *Collected Works of Hwang Hyeon*) written by Hwang-Hyeon (黃珪) can help one truly understand what the ruling class truly thought.

42) Pyeong-muk Kim (金平默), “Chido sa ui (治道私議),” in Volume 35 of *Collected Works of Chungam* (重菴集), the 320th Book of *Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese* (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 2003), 18-19.

43) Ibid., (金平默), “NohGang surok (鷺江隨錄),” in Volume 39 of *Collected Works of Chungam* (重菴集), op. cit., 96-97.

His majesty (King Gojong, the author's note) took the throne at the age of thirteen. Several years later, when he heard that 'King Tang of the Shang dynasty unified the whole country in an area of 70 li and King Wen of Zhou Dynasty made all vassal states under his reign in a place of about 100 li' in Mencius at the Royal Lectures, his majesty looked around and declaimed, 'the two kings can rule a world within only 70 li or 100 li. Our country boasts an area of about 3,000 li. How can we take possession of Yanyun (燕雲, the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun, the author's note) by force and wash our dishonor (the Byongjahoran, 丙子胡亂, the Manchu Invasion of 1636, the author's note)?' Nobody at the lecture could give an answer. Then Shin Chung-hee (申正熙), who attended the lecture as a military royal secretary, walked out from the ranks and replied, 'That's easy.' His majesty asked, 'What's the way?' Shin Chung-hee (申正熙) answered, 'We can achieve it if your majesty can strive for virtue and morality' (上年十三御極, 既數年, 嘗御經筵, 講孟子, 至湯以七十里, 文王百里, 慨然顧曰, 七十里百里, 猶可以爲政於天下, 況我國三千里者乎, 何以則能秣馬燕雲, 洗祖宗之恥, 筵中莫能對, 時申正熙, 以武承旨入侍, 越班對曰, 此易易爾, 上遍問曰, 策安在, 對曰願殿下修德。).⁴⁴⁾

From this record one can infer that the Joseon government still harbored a grudge towards the Manchu War of 1636 (丙子胡亂) even in the late period of the Joseon Dynasty. For them, the Qing government was only a powerful state they had to serve, and the corresponding reason lay in their inability to conquer the Qing. As the civil official of Joseon Jeong Beom-jo (丁範祖) said, "We serve Qing just because we are weaker, not because we are willing (姑力屈而事彼也。非甘心也。)."⁴⁵⁾ So, when there

44) Hyeon Hwang (黃玑), "Maecheon yarok (梅泉野錄, Collected Works of Hwang Hyeon)," in Hanguk saryo chongsō (韓國史料叢書, Collected Books of Korean History), ed. National Institute of Korean History (國史編纂委員會) (Seoul: National Institute of Korean History, 1971), 1.

45) Beom-jo Jeong (丁範祖), "Cheongwaeron (清倭論)," in Haejwa Chip (海左集, *The*

were signs indicating the Qing's decline, some Confucianists not in office voiced their support for the Northern Conquest (北伐, or, euphemistically, Northern Expedition),⁴⁶⁾ hence rendering the nation-state relationship to become unstable. All these are the logical outcome of the aforementioned attitude held by the Joseon Dynasty towards the Qing.

Secondly, the Joseon attitude is closely connected with the Qing government's self-interested policies. When Joseon was invaded by western countries, especially during the byeonginyangyo (丙寅洋擾, the French invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1866) and Sinmiyangyo (辛未洋擾, the American invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1871), and asked the Qing government to assist them as one of Qing's vassal states in resisting the western powers and to protect Joseon's interests, the Qing government chose to evade the request and asked Joseon to "dispose at will" the crisis so as to shake off the possible "responsibility" brought by intervening between transactions between Joseon and the western countries.⁴⁷⁾ For instance,

Collected Works of Haejwa, the 240th Book of *Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese* (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 1999), 179. Jeong (丁) was a civil official during the reign of King Jeongjo of Joseon (reign time: 1776-1800), which was also a time of the Emperor Qianlong heyday in the Qing Dynasty. Thus, it can be inferred that the Joseon government harbored no real obedience to the Qing Dynasty despite its prime time.

46) Apart from Pyeong-muk Kim (金平默), the representative of the Joseon mainstream Wijeong-cheoksa pa (衛正斥邪派, the school of defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy) Hang-no Yi (李恒老, 1792 - 1868) and Gi-soen Shin (申箕善, 1851-1909), etc. all positively advocated the North Conquest (北伐 or, euphemistically, Northern Expedition). See Hang-no Yi (李恒老), "Ryu Joong-kyo rok (柳重教錄)," in the 305th book of *Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese* (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 2003), 420-429. Gi-soen Shin (申箕善), "Hwieon (彙言)," in the 348th book of *Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese* (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 2005), 358-363..

47) Yuewu Liu (柳岳武), "A Study of Manchu Courts Vassal Policy During the Reign of Daoguang, Xianfeng and Tongzhi (道、咸、同时期清廷属国政策之研究)," *Journal of Hangzhou Normal University (Social Sciences Edition)* (杭州师范大学学报 (社会科学

during the Sinmiyangyo (辛未洋擾, the American invasion of Ganghwa Island) in 1871, Joseon submitted the incident to Qing for intermediation and Prince Kung (恭親王) then reported it to Emperor Tongzhi for counterplan:

Their (Joseon's, the author's note) so-called seeking protect from China does not originate from genuine sincerity but taking China as the way to shake off the responsibility. Therefore, about the two countries (Joseon and the U. S., the author's note)' dispute, what China can do is to intermediate and persuade the U. S. not to march into Joseon. There is no other way out for them (Joseon, the author's note) from China (其所謂求中國保護者。並非盡出真忱。不過欲借中國為卸肩地耳。故該二國構釁一事。中國只有從中排解。勸美國不必前往。此外別無可為代籌之策。)⁴⁸⁾

Therefore, the Qing government held a rational attitude towards Joseon and adopted the utilitarian policy of avoiding the responsibility as they did not want to risk the Qing's "national fate" for the interests of Joseon. This formed a sharp contrast with the Ming Dynasty which "sent troops to cross the sea to save the vassal state afar (然猶欲涉海出師, 遠救屬國)" despite "the Qing's forceful invasion of Liaoyang (遼陽) and rampant bandits in central China (清兵滿遼陽, 流賊遍中原)." Ming Emperor Chongzhen (崇禎帝) thus won the heartfelt gratitude of the Joseon king and ministers who once commented, "when in the midnight, thinking of Ming's favor, we couldn't help shedding tears (中夜念此, 不覺淚下)."⁴⁹⁾ By

版) 4 (2008): 85.

48) Bao Yun (寶瑩) (Qing) et al., "Volume 14 of Making Arrangements for Foreign Affairs (During the Reign of Emperor Tongzhi) (籌辦夷務始末(同治朝)十四)," in the 62th edition of *Collectaneum of Modern Chinese History* (近代中國史料叢刊), ed. Shen Yunlong (沈雲龍) (Taipei: The Wenhai Press, 1971), 7745.

49) March 2nd of King Yeongjo (英祖) Year 25 (1749), *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty*:

contrast, the Qing government's evasion greatly disappointed the Joseon government.

According to the author of this paper, the different policies of the Ming and the Qing towards Joseon are definitely one of the key causes for Joseon's negative perceptions of the Qing Dynasty. The author also holds that the attitude of Park Ji-won (朴趾源) (1737-1805) toward the Qing Dynasty and the Ming Dynasty can serve as an important warning. As one great thinker of the Bug-Hag School (北學派, the School of Northern Studies), he has repeatedly discussed how the superior state (上國) differs from the great state (大國), and Qing's policies to Joseon for the sake of improving relations, such as exempting annual tributes, were at best "favor (惠)" but not "grace (恩)," which is totally incomparable to the Ming Dynasty's "grace (恩)" of rebirth.⁵⁰ Park Ji-won (朴趾源) as the

The Annals of King Yeongjo (朝鮮王朝實錄·英祖實錄).

50) Ji-won Park (朴趾源) said when referring to the relations between Joseon and the Ming Dynasty, "The Imperial Brightness (the Ming Dynasty, the author's note) is a superior state to us. (The middle section is omitted.) Four hundred years have already passed, yet their grace is still clearly imprinted in our minds. We should not forget what the Ming has given us. (The middle section is omitted.) Their favor and grace is deeply imprinted on our minds and hearts. What our following generations can rely is our superior nation's benevolence (皇明。吾上國也。(中略)四百年猶一日。蓋吾明室之恩。不可忘也。(中略)恩在肌髓。萬世永賴。皆吾上國之恩也。)" In between the lines is full of gratitude for Ming's grace of rebirth. On the contrary, toward the Qing Dynasty, he said, "We do not regard it as the superior nation. Why? It is not the true China. We yield to a great state because we are not as strong as it is. A great state can overawe us by power. (The middle section is omitted.) The Qing now favors us with the exemption, which is in nature the "Cherishing Men from Afar" policy (懷柔遠人, literally Conciliation of Distant Tribes) to show solicitude for the weak. Hence, their reducing one year's tribute or money is in fact the favor, not the grace (不謂之上國者。何也。非中華也。我力屈而服彼。則大國也。大國能以力而屈之。(中略)今其賜賚之寵。蠲免之諭。在大國不過為卹小柔遠之政。則雖代蠲一貢。歲免一幣。是惠也。非吾所謂恩也。)" Ji-won Park (朴趾源), "Haengjae jamnok (行在雜錄)," in Volume 13 of *Yŏnam Chip* (燕巖集) of the 252th book of *Korean Literary Collections in Classical Chinese* (韓國文集叢刊) (Seoul: The Korean Classics Research Institute (民族文化推進會), 2000), 242-245.

representative of the Bug-Hag School held such attitude towards the Qing and how the others in Joseon thought about Qing was totally imaginable.

4. Conclusion

This article considers how the Joseon Dynasty perceived and reacted to the trials faced by the Qing Dynasty resulting from the First and Second Opium Wars of the 19th century. The findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the Joseon Dynasty felt the same sense of crisis faced by the Qing Dynasty's inner challenges, and acknowledged that their fates were closely intertwined. Secondly, amidst the aforementioned sense of crisis, the Joseon Dynasty maintained its traditional subservient relations with the Qing Dynasty. At the same time, this traditional relationship faced destabilisation from the Joseon people's increasing demands for a sense of respect. Thirdly, two sources of this destabilisation can be identified. One is that while the Joseon Dynasty maintained subservient relations with the Qing Dynasty, there was limited genuine interest in doing so. The other source can be identified in the Qing Dynasty's self-interested stance in relation to Joseon Dynasty bilateral policy—particularly in comparison to the policies of the Ming Dynasty.

Yet, what should be noticed is that although the reality-based, utilitarian attitude the Qing government adopted was the rational choice, it would also be the final catalyst for estranging the two countries. This is clearly presented in Joseon's perceptions of the Qing Dynasty. The superior state (上國) is different from the great state (大國). “Favor (惠)” is definitely not “grace (恩).”. Therefore, according to the author of this paper, in the present day which is of increasing demand for the construction of a “Northeast Asian Community,” the aforementioned

Joseon's perceptions of China can shed light on how to promote mutual trust and cooperation in eastern Asia and form a true Northeast Asian cultural identity.

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<국문초록>

1860년대 및 1870년대 청나라에 대한 조선의 인식 : 아편전쟁을 중심으로

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1860년대와 1870년대 중국의 청 왕조는 아편전쟁과 태평반란과 같은 일련의 심각한 난관들로 인해 전례 없는 통치 위기에 직면했다. 이런 상황에서 조선 왕조는 청의 통치 위기를 어떻게 인식하고 직면했을까? 그 당시 중국-조선 관계는 어떠한가? 본 논문은 조선 왕조실록(朝鮮王朝實錄), 일성록(日省錄), 승문원일기(承文院日記)와 같은 정부 간행물과 김윤식의 운양집(雲養集), 박규수의 환재총서(環齋叢書), 김평묵의 중암집(重菴集), 이견창의 명미당집(明美堂集) 및 황현의 매천야록(梅泉野錄)과 같은 관련 인사들의 전집을 살펴보면서 서술 분석 과정에서 수직적 비교 방법을 사용해서 청나라에 대한 조선의 인식 변화를 조사하였다. 본 논문이 주장하는 바는 다음과 같다. 조선은 청나라가 내적 난관으로 인해 직면했던 위기감과 동일한 위기감을 느끼고 있었으며 양국 운명이 밀접하게 얽혀 있다고 인정했다. 또한 존중심에 대한 조선 백성의 요구가 증가하여 전통적 사대(事大)관계를 불안하게 했다.

주요어: 아편전쟁, 조선왕조, 청왕조에 대한 인식, 위기의식, 19세기

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